I'll get back to you on that.Originally Posted by crisis
Don't try to bring in "sickening blind patriotism" into it (whatever that means). The two A-bombs did end WWII with Japan.It matters that one person made a decision to kill thousands of civilians and destroy two cities despite the advice of his military. What was the motivation when so many high ranking military leaders believed it would have no effect on tending the war. If you could put aside your sickening blind patriotism for a second you would see that the excuse that it “saved thousands more lives” is clearly written by the U.S. to try to justify this inexcusable act.
Pres. Truman figured that the lives lost in the two A-bombs were preferable to the many thousands more lost if the war went on even longer.
Many may have "believed" the Japanese were ready to surrender, but a few notable high-ranking officials were not.Considering there were mearly 4 days between bombings it didn’t give them a lot of time. And as stated in the quotes I have posted many believed surrender negotiations were already underway.
http://www.doug-long.com/hiroshim.htm
Japan had received what would seem to have been overwhelming shocks. Yet, after two atomic bombings, massive conventional bombings and the Soviet invasion, the Japanese government still refused to surrender.
The Postdam Proclamation had called for "Japan to decide whether she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed militaristic advisers" (U.S. Dept. of State, Postdam 2, pg 1475). On the 13th, the Supreme Council For the Direction of the War (known as the "Big 6") met to address the Postdam Proclamation's call for surrender. Three members of the Big 6 favored immediate surrender; but the other three- War Minister Anami, Army Chief of Staff Umezu, and Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda- adamantly refused. The meeting adjourned in a deadlock, with no decision to surrender (Butow, pg. 200-202).
Later that day, the Japanese Cabinet met. It was only this body- not the Big 6, not even the Emperor- that could rule as to whether Japan could surrender. And a unamimous decision was required (Butow, pg. 176-177, 208). But again War Minister Anami led the opponents of surrender, resulting in a vote of 12 in favor of surrender, 3 against, and 1 undecided. The key concern for the Japanese military was loss of honor, not Japan's destruction. Having failed to reach a decision to surrender, the Cabinet adjourned (Sigal, pg. 265-267).